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IN ADDRESSING FOREIGN LANGUAGE
AND CULTURAL BARRIERS AT
DIFFERENT STAGES OF A
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
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INTRODUCTION

With the growing racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of the
United States, issues of language and cultural barriers to equal jus
tice are increasingly confronting prosecutors, defense counsel, and
the courts. In 1990, in Massachusetts alone, 350,000 persons, or
6.2% of all Massachusetts residents over the age of five did not
speak English adequately or at all. 1 Nationally, it is "estimated that
... in 1990 the number of home speakers of non-English languages
was nearly 32 million or approximately 12.6% of the total
population. "2
* Assistant Attorney General, Chief of the Civil Rights Division, Office of the
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ington University; J.D., 1974, Boston University School of Law.
** Assistant Attorney General, Public Charities Division, Office of the Attorney
General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Ph.D., 1969, Harvard University;
Ph.D., 1981, University of Paris; J.D., 1992, Harvard Law School.
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of Massachusetts. Copyright © 1996 - All rights reserved.
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRA·
TlON, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, MASSACHUSETTS tbl.2, at 10 (1990).
2. State v. Santiago, 542 N.W.2d 466, 471 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (citing WIL·
LlAM E. HEWITT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT INTERPRETATION:
MODEL GUIDES FOR POLICE AND PRACTICE IN THE STATE COURTS 11 (1995)).
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For a criminal defendant, the ability to understand all proceed
ings and communicate and consult with counsel at all times has a
direct impact on the defendant's right to a fair trial and to other
constitutional protections. The prosecution must also confront the
issue of language. If a victim cannot communicate adequately in
court, the state will have difficulty in meeting its burden of proof.
English language difficulty hinders the right of equal access to
the criminal justice system. Even if a defendant, victim, or witness
speaks some English, he or she may not communicate or compre
hend English adequately for a legal proceeding. In order to avoid
significant misunderstandings, a hurdle of constitutional impor
tance, the defendant or witness may need an interpreter. This is not
due solely to the legal terms and more sophisticated forms of Eng
lish used in courtrooms, but also because many persons who use
English as a second language have difficulty speaking or compre
hending English in a pressured or highly charged situation, or in a
location that is not part of their common experience, such as in a
courtroom or at a police station. 3
Given these language barriers, the role and competence of the
interpreter is critical. Competent interpretation includes the ability
to speak, understand, and accurately interpret the dialect of the for
eign language witness, victim, or defendant. Misinterpretation of
particular words or idioms may cause prejudice where an inter
preter provides meanings or voice inflection that the defendant or
witness did not intend. 4 Dialect differences may be significant.
The words used in one dialect to describe an emotion or idea may
be quite different from those same words used in another dialect.
Idioms or colloquial expressions from one dialect to another may
not be able to be interpreted at all. For example, because the
meaning of some words differs from country to country, an inter
preter who grew up in the United States, and who speaks the Span
ish used in the United States, may make critical errors in
interpreting the Spanish spoken by a defendant or witness born and
raised in Columbia. 5 A proper voir diremay be necessary to ensure
3. See Commonwealth v. Pana, 364 A.2d 895, 898-99 (Pa. 1976); see also Com
monwealth v. Sanabria, 385 A.2d 1292, 1298 (Pa. 1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
4. See Santana v. New York City Transit Auth., 505 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986); see also United States v. Gaviria, 775 F. Supp. 495, 501 (D.R.I. 1991);
State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (three bilingual interpreters
examined audio tape and transcript of trial for appeal; all agreed there were errors in
translation, but disagreed as to "the extent of the problem and the degree of prejudice,
as well as the correct translation of specific testimony").
5. See, e.g., United States v. castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th CiT. 1983) (refer
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that even a court certified interpreter is qualified to interpret for a
particular defendant or witness.
Other translation challenges confront even qualified court in
terpreters. At times, an interpreter is unable to interpret ade
quately because the concept at issue does not exist in the foreign
culture. Furthermore, "[c]ourts have recognized that words in one
language may not be capable of exact translation into another lan
guage, and it is therefore impossible in certain circumstances for an
interpreter to convey the precise language of the witness to the
court, jury, or defendant."6 It may be difficult to interpret certain
legal concepts since many immigrants come from countries with
legal systems very different from that of the United States. If no
jury trial exists in the legal system of the defendant's home country,
how does an interpreter explain the right to trial by jury so as to
ensure a voluntary and knowing waiver of that right?
Many individuals born and raised in foreign countries confront
other practical obstacles to obtaining justice.7 Some lived in a
country where police and authority figures terrorize its citizens.
Immigrants from these countries often distrust and fear the police
in the United States. Many immigrants lack familiarity with our
legal system or have limited, if any, understanding of constitutional
rights and procedures.
Some defendants, victims, or witnesses from different cultures
may be misunderstood, or their actions, appearance, or demeanor
misinterpreted by police, parties, jurors, or the court itself. This is
because social and behavioral norms of persons from a foreign
country may appear suspect because they are not within the com
mon experience of native-born Americans. Excessive and exagger
ated hand gestures, for example, may be incorrectly interpreted as a
sign of threatening behavior or emotional instability rather than be
havior learned as a child in a foreign culture to accentuate a point.
ring to the district court's comment "that the Spanish spoken in North America differs
from that spoken in South America, which would create confusion on the part of the
government agents" and the defendant); see also State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 831
32 (Minn. 1987).
6. State v. Casipe, 686 P.2d 28, 33 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984); see also Her, 510 N.W.2d
at 223 ("Any translation is inevitably a screen placed between the witness and the jury,
affecting the jury's ability to assess credibility from demeanor, inflection of voice, nu
ances of language, and details of testimony. "); State v. Fung, 907 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).
7. See Her, 510 N.W.2d at 221 ("The apparent differences between Hmong and
American cultures in their treatment of rape, adultery, and female sexuality were a
major element of the trial. ").
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Prejudicial misimpressions may result because a defendant fails to
make eye contact with the police or jury, speaks in a voice unnatu
rally loud or soft, or appears without emotion. These and other
forms of non-verbal communication may be misinterpreted because
of cultural differences. An understanding of cultural norms may be
relevant and necessary to the accurate evaluation of a defendant's
demeanor and behavior in interactions with the police, in assessing
witness credibility, as well as in determining the level of culpability
and contrition of a defendant for sentencing purposes.
Cultural and language barriers may affect whether a defendant
is able to make a voluntary confession,8 knowingly and voluntarily
consent to a search,9 waive the right to trial by jury,lO or fully un
derstand the elements of the charge,11 the rights waived,12 and the
effect of the plea in a plea bargain proceeding.!3 Lack of knowl
edge of the American legal system, rights under the Constitution,
English language difficulties, and cultural background differences,
along with other factors, have been considered in judicial assess
ments of whether there is a voluntary and knowing waiver of such
rights. I4
Courts have made clear that there is a legal duty and require
ment to accommodate those with linguistic and cultural barriers. I5
But what does that really mean? This Article surveys the contours
of the right to an interpreter and the impact of cultural differences
in the context of specific court determinations. Proceeding step-by
step through the criminal justice system from the establishment of
the professional relationship to the sentencing hearing, linguistic
and cultural issues are examined, with a focus on the broad array of
trial and appellate issues at play.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER

The right to a court-appointed interpreter in criminal proceed
8. See infra part III.B.
9. See infra part III.e.
10. See infra part III.G.
11. See infra part III.H.
12. See infra part III.H.
13. See infra part III.H.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp. 665,674-75 (D. Mass.
1986); United States v. Nakhoul, 596 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (D. Mass. 1984), affd sub
nom. United States v. EI-Debeib, 802 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1986).
15. See United States v. Gallegos-Torres, 841 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1988) (de
fendant who has difficulty with language has right to interpreter).
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ings is squarely within the discretion of the trial judge. 16 Only in
limited circumstances have appellate courts held that the failure of
trial courts to afford adequate interpreter services constituted an
abuse of discretion or was clearly erroneous in violation of a de
fendant's federal or state constitutional or statutory rights,17
Although different judicial tests have been applied to deter
mine if failure to provide an interpreter was error, appellate courts
appear to focus the inquiry on whether a defendant had been de
nied a fair trial or whether the proceedings were fundamentally un
fair, considering the totality of the circumstances. The review is
highly factual and varies from case to case. Where a trial court has
failed to appoint a qualified interpreter, the burden falls on the
criminal defendant to show that his lack of comprehension of the
proceeding was so complete that the trial was fundamentally unfair.
The California Supreme Court has described in vivid detail the
breadth of the criminal defendant's right to, and need for, an inter
preter at every stage of a criminal proceeding:
The defendant's right to understand the instructions and rul
ings of the judge, the questions and objections of defense counsel
and the prosecution, as well as the testimony of the witnesses is a
continuous one. At moments crucial to the defense-when evi
dentiary rulings and jury instructions are given by the court,
when damaging testimony is being introduced-the non-English
speaking defendant who is denied the assistance of an inter
preter, is unable to communicate with the court or with counsel
and is unable to understand and participate in the proceedings
which hold the key to freedom.18
II.

DENIAL OF INTERPRETER ASSISTANCE:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Several courts in criminal cases have discussed whether the
lack of continuous, competent interpreter services personal to the
defendant rises to the level of a constitutional or statutory depriva
tion. 19 In determining whether the trial court's failure to appoint an
16. See United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1991) (matters regard
ing use of interpreter left to discretion of district court); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d
465,475 n.3 (Tenn. 1993) (collecting cases).
17. See People v. Escalante, 627 N.E.2d 1222, 1224, 1227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(defendant's right to fair trial denied by court's refusal to wait for interpreter to appear
before beginning examination of state witness).
18. People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Cal. 1984) (in bank).
·.19. See, e.g., People v. Truong, 553 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) .
.

.
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interpreter denied the defendant a fair trial or rendered the crimi
nal proceeding fundamentally unfair, appellate courts ask the fol
lowing questions:
(1) Did the non-English speaking defendant have counsel,
and, if so, was the defendant able to consult with and assist his
or her attorney?20
(2) Did the defendant possess sufficient fluency in English to
understand the testimony heard, the charges alleged, and the
rights recited, or was he or she significantly inhibited in the
ability to comprehend any portion of the proceedings?21
(3) Did the defendant understand and respond to questions
during examination without substantial difficulty?22
(4) Did the defendant inform the trial court that he or she re
quired an interpreter in order to make each and every aspect
of the criminal proceeding comprehensible, or should the trial
court have recognized that the defendant's comprehension at
trial was significantly inhibited by language difficulties, and, if
so, was interpretation provided at all times?23
(5) Were the indictment and other critical written documents
translated and provided in writing to the non-English speaking
defendant in his or her own language?24
(6) Was the defendant actually prejudiced by his or her inabil
ity to comprehend any portion of the proceedings?2S
(7) Did the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waive the
right to have an interpreter at trial?26
Other questions asked by appellate courts to ensure that crimi
nal proceedings themselves were fundamentally fair and that the
defendant preserved his or her legal rights include:
(1) Was the interpreter "certified" or "qualified"?27
20. See, e.g., People v. Avila, 797 P.2d 804, 806 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
21. See, e.g., Ton v. State, 878 P.2d 986, 987 (Nev. 1994).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1991).
23. See, e.g., Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1362 (Del. 1992).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd,
48 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994); People v. Torres, 310 N.E.2d 780, 783 (III. App. Ct. 1974).
25. See, e.g., State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (to succeed
on appeal, defendant must show "tangible prejudice from the specific errors identi
fied"); State v. Langarica, 822 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Nev. 1991) (finding no prejudice to
defendant regarding guilty plea resulting from language barrier).
26. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 682 A.2d 764, 770-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1996).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 1128, 1135 (2d Cir. 1992) (Court
Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(I) (1994) requires interpreters be certified or
otherwise qualified). But see Mendiola v. State, 924 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex. App. 1995)
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(2) Was the interpreter competent and impartial?28
(3) Was the interpretation generally accurate?29
(4) Did the defendant alert the court in a timely fashion of the
deficient qualifications or lack of impartiality of the interpreter
or timely object to the lack of accuracy of the interpreter serv
ices provided?30
Factors that courts consider in determining a defendant's need
for an interpreter are the defendant's length of stay in the United
States, the nature of his or her professional or social interaction
while residing in this country, as well as occupation, education, in
telligence level, and citizenship status. Some courts will focus only
on the defendant's level of fluency in speaking English. 31

III.

PRE-TRIAL STAGE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Establishing the Professional Relationship

Consideration of linguistic barriers for those who speak little
or no English, or who come from a different country or culture,
begins from the moment that counsel establishes a professional re
lationship with the defendant, complainant, or witness.
The first question that a defense attorney must consider is:
"Can I adequately communicate with the defendant?" A prosecu
tor must ask a similar question in working with complainants. If the
defendant or complainant does not speak English and if counsel is
not fluent in this foreign language, a competent interpreter should
be immediately obtained. Even if the defendant or complainant
speaks some English, counsel should retain an interpreter in order
to ensure that confusion and misunderstandings do not develop.
Defense counsel should also explore with the defendant any
(interpreter not required to be certified under state law, but must have sufficient skill in
interpreting and familiarity with slang).
28. See Gonzales v. State, 372 A.2d 191, 192-93 (De\. 1977) (reversible error for
trial judge not to appoint unbiased and impartial interpreter); State v. Tamez, 506 So.
2d 531, 533-35 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (guilty plea vacated where co-defendant interpreted
plea colloquy and trial court failed to try to find impartial interpreter); Mendiola, 924
S.W.2d at 162 (bailiff found competent to serve as defendant's interpreter).
29. See Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Ind. 1989) (where accuracy of trans
lation subject to grave doubt, defendant denied due process); People v. Truong, 553
N.W.2d 692, 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (minor lapses in translation did not render trial
unfair or deprive defendant of constitutional rights).
30. See, e.g., Her, 510 N.W.2d at 222-23; People v. Gordillo, 594 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1986) (collecting
cases).
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. cultural biases or barriers that could affect his or her representa
tion, including the preparation and presentation of the defendant's
case. The defendant may have emigrated from a country with a
criminal justice system vastly different from ours. Defense counsel
should take the time to explain the nature of the criminal justice
system, the jury system, the role of police and prosecutors, and the
rights of a criminal defendant. It may be necessary for the prosecu
tor to take similar steps with complainants.
From the outset, defense counsel must also examine his or her
own cultural biases, as well as those the defendant is likely to en
counter in the ordinary course of criminal proceedings. Counsel
needs to determine if he or she has any biases that might interfere
with the ability to serve as an effective advocate on behalf of this
defendant. Defense counsel must consider if others (police, prose
cutors, judges, or jurors) likely have biases which may lead, or
which have already led them to misunderstand the defendant's ac
tions, attitude, motives, or demeanor because of differences in cul
tural background. Many of the same inquiries may be appropriate
for a prosecutor to consider in working with complainants, as well
as for the purpose of ensuring the defendant a fair trial and avoid
ing reversal on appeaL
B.

The Arrest and the Interrogation

Questioning by police can be upsetting to anyone. Consider,
then, the potential for confusion and anxiety of someone subjected
to an arrest or interrogation who does not speak English. Defense
counsel as well as prosecutors should probe thoroughly all aspects
of the arrest to ensure that language barriers or cultural back
ground did not taint the investigation, lead to a violation of rights,
or to an unknowing or involuntary waiver during interrogation.
Counsel should begin the inquiry with any statements the de
fendant may have made before being advised of his or her constitu
tional rights. Who was present? What were the circumstances?
Who interpreted? Was the interpretation accurate? Did the police
record it accurately?
If the defendant made statements after being given Miranda
warnings, counsel should carefully examine the circumstances to
ensure that his or her rights were "knowingly and intelligently"
waived. 32 This means much more than the fact that the police
32.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 434, 444 (1966) (indicating that a defendant,
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translated the Miranda warnings into the defendant's language.
Counsel must consider, in addition to the defendant's background,
understanding of the American legal system, and all the surround
ing circumstances to determine the adequacy of the warnings and
the sufficiency of the waiver.
In this regard, an important case is United States v. Nakhoul. 33
Considering motions made by three Middle Eastern defendants to
suppress post-arrest statements on the grounds of an invalid waiver,
the federal district court of Massachusetts stated that the appropri
ate inquiry should cover "all the circumstances surrounding the in
terrogation, including the defendants' age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence."34 The Nakhoul court allowed the
suppression motion of one defendant, a Lebanese national living in
the United States, who "was locked up, alone, in a small windowless
room for a period of time and then questioned by two unfamiliar"
investigators. 35 The court reasoned that Nakhoul's understanding
of American law, customs, and constitutional rights may have been
too limited and the warnings too inadequate in this situation to per
mit him to understand his rights. 36 Another important case is
United States v. Short,37 where the Sixth Circuit found English-only
Miranda warnings insufficient for a West German defendant who
had been in the United States only three months, barely spoke Eng
lish, was socially isolated while living on an army base, and was
unfamiliar with the American criminal justice system. 38
Other courts have also affirmed the relevance of alienage and
lack of familiarity with the American legal system to the judicial
inquiry, while denying the motion to suppress based on the totality
of the facts presented in the particular case. 39 In United States v.
Youse/,40 however, one defendant, charged with conspiring to deafter being informed of his rights, "may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently").
33. 596 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Mass. 1984), affd sub nom. United States v. El-Debeib,
802 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 1401.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 1401-02.
37. 790 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1986).
38. See id. at 469.
39. See United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United
States v. Trabucco, 424 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (5th Cir. 1970); Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376,
1380-82 (Del. 1993) (cultural experts testified at suppression hearing that it was ex
tremely unlikely that a Chinese immigrant would fail to submit automatically to a police
request).
.
40. 925 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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stroy an airplane, among other allegations, unsuccessfully argued
that the voluntariness of his confession made to the FBI was af
fected by the alleged torture and physical abuse he had suffered for
three months while in the custody of Philippine law enforcement
officials. The court refused to impute the coercive nature of his
Philippine detention to American law enforcement officials, since
no American "official coercion" was claimed. 41
To succeed in a motion to suppress, it may at times be neces
sary for the defense to use an expert linguist who personally evalu
ates the defendant's lack of English language comprehension. In
United States v. Higareda-Santa Cruz ,42 the federal district court in
Oregon, relying in part on an expert linguist's testimony about the
defendant's English language limitations, granted the motion of a
Mexican drug defendant to suppress evidence and statements be
cause the defendant did not understand what rights he was waiv
ing.43 The district court concluded that the prosecution had not
shown that the defendant had made a valid waiver. 44
Does a subsequent request for interpreter services necessarily
invalidate prior statements given without the presence of an inter
preter? One court has held that the fact that a defendant requests
an interpreter for his court proceedings renders suspect, but does
not automatically invalidate, Miranda warnings given without the
aid of an interpreter. 45 The federal district court in United States v.
Granados 46 determined that Miranda warnings provided solely in
English were constitutionally sufficient, even where a non-English
speaking defendant had requested an interpreter at trial, since the
police officer had explicitly asked the defendant if he understood
those rights. The transcript of the interrogation by police revealed
that the defendant spoke and understood English fairly wel1. 47
Most appellate courts, ruling on the adequacy of interpreta
tions of Miranda warnings to individuals with some form of lan
41. [d. at 1077 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985)) (stating that
the Fifth Amendment is only "concerned with moral and psychological pressures to
confess emanating from ... official coercion").
42. 826 F. Supp. 355 (D. Or. 1993).
43. See id. at 358-60.
44. See id. at 360. But see United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412,
1415 (9th Cir. 1985); Liu, 628 A.2d at 1380.
45. See United States v. Lizardo-Acosta, No. 93-40030-020-SAC, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6351, at *26-27 (D. Kan. Apr. 4, 1994).
46. 846 F. Supp. 921 (D. Kan. 1994).
47. See id. at 924-25; see also Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir.
1989).
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guage or cultural barrier, have relied upon practical tests to
determine whether defendants' waivers were voluntary. For exam
ple, in United States v. Abou-Saada,48 the First Circuit denied the
defendant's appeal, relying in part on the defendant's ability to pro
vide, in English, to an interrogating agent of the Drug Enforcement
Agency, a detailed medical description of a complicated neck in
jury.49 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Bernard S. ,50 relied on the fact that after
the law enforcement officer had explained to the defendant in Eng
lish each of his rights, the defendant affirmatively stated that he
understood those rights. The defendant, whose primary language
was Apache, also stated that he did not have any questions. 51
Many courts, applying the clearly erroneous standard, have af
firmed trial courts' findings of a voluntary waiver. In Common
wealth v. Colon,52 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
concluded that the trial court had not erred in finding that the
waiver was knowing and intelligent despite the defendant's allega
tions that he was unable to speak English. 53 The court also discred
ited the defendant's allegation that he was beaten during
interrogation. 54
Generally, when police show a card containing Miranda warn
ings in the non-English speaking defendant's language, it is suffi
cient to permit a waiver of rights if the defendant has read the card
and indicates an understanding of what he has read. 55 In United
States v. Toscano-Padilla,56 a conviction for drug traffic conspiracy
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit where the Spanish-speaking de
fendant understood and waived his Miranda rights read to him
from a card preprinted in Spanish, even though the Miranda waiver
form he signed was written in English. An INS agent testified that
he translated the waiver form into Spanish, paragraph by para
graph, before the form was initialed and signed by Toscano-Pa
48. 785 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
49. See id. at 10.
50. 795 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1986).
51. See id. at 752.
52. 558 N.E.2d 974 (Mass. 1990).
53. See id. at 980; see also Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1509-10 (11th Cir.
1991) (Cuban-born Spanish-speaking police officer interpreted for defendant); Com
monwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 466 (Mass. 1980) (Spanish-speaking police officer
translated and explained Miranda warnings to defendant).
54. See Colon, 558 N.E.2d at 980.
55. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 581 N.E.2d lOW, 1015 (Mass. 1991).
56. No. 92-30247, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15411 (9th Cir. June 16, 1993).

204

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:193

dilla. 57 The agent's translation ability was not questioned at tria1. 58
The Ninth Circuit held that the execution of a written waiver,
printed in the defendant's own language; while preferable, is not
mandatory for the waiver to be valid. 59
To create a record on which to appeal a court's ruling that Mi
randa warnings were adequately interpreted, a defendant must in
troduce evidence of the questionable interpretation practices of the
interpreter, the terms or legal concepts misused, or evidence dem
onstrating a defendant's lack of comprehension. 60 In Common
wealth v. Colon-Cruz,61 the defendant's attorney unsuccessfully
challenged the linguistic adequacy of translated Miranda warnings.
During cross examination, he asked a bilingual police officer to re
peat the Miranda warnings he had given in Spanish to the Spanish
speaking defendant on the night of the arrest. 62 The court inter
preter then was requested to evaluate the competence of the of
ficer's interpretation. 63 Based on the interpreter's testimony, the
trial court found, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, that de
spite two minor errors, there was no evidence that the warnings had
been distorted or were inaccurate. 64
The issue of the bias or competence of the interpreter who pro
vided Miranda warnings should be raised by defense counsel, when
appropriate. However, a defendant does not have a constitutional
right to an independent, non-police translator when questioned
prior to tria1. 65 In addition, a defendant does not have a right to an
interpreter with the advanced language skills of a court interpreter,
since at this stage of the criminal process the standards for court
interpreters have no application. 66 However, in State v. Santiago,67
57. See id. at *2-3.
58. See id. at *3.
59. See id. at *3 n.1.
60. See United States v. Lopez-Parra, No. 91-50747, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
13077, at *2-3 (9th Cir. May 28, 1993); State v. Roman, 616 A.2d 266, 269-70 (Conn.
1992) (defendant did not challenge interpreter's competence and stated that he under
stood what had transpired during police interview); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 451
N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Mass. 1983) (defendant who testified in English presented no evi
dence that he did not understand English).
61. 562 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 1990).
62. See id. at 803.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 804.
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alves, 625 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
66. See, e.g., People v. Marquez, 822 P.2d 418, 427 (Cal. 1992); see also State v.
Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 829-31 (Minn. 1987).
67. 542 N.W.2d 466 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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a defendant successfully appealed a drug conviction where he re
ceived Miranda warnings in Spanish from a Milwaukee police of
ficer who had no formal training in Spanish and could neither read
nor write Spanish, but could speak the language fluently.68 The of
ficer testified that the words he had actually used were not close to
those on the commonly available Spanish language Miranda card,
but instead gave a "street language" version. 69 Although defense
counsel requested that the officer recite the Spanish words he had
used to provide the Miranda warnings, and that the court-ap
pointed interpreter translate those words into English for the rec
ord, the trial court refused to allow this procedure.7° Unable to
write in Spanish, the officer could not provide a written version. In
the absence of a clear and accurate record of the actual Miranda
warnings given, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that
there was insufficient evidence to permit review. The court then
vacated and reversed the conviction and remanded the case for fur
ther evidentiary hearings. 71
C.

The Consent to Search
If the defendant consented to a search, many of the above con

siderations would also apply. Counsel must determine whether the
defendant's consent was voluntary; that, in turn, requires counsel to
examine the totality of the circumstances. English language com
prehension, cultural background, and understanding of the Ameri
can legal system may be relevant factors.7 2
Lack of English language comprehension caused the federal
district court of Illinois, in United States v. Yambo,73 to grant a
Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican defendant's motion to suppress
physical evidence from a search at O'Hare Airport in Chicago. Re
lying in part on the defendant's linguistic expert, the court found
that although the defendant understood that the law enforcement
officers wanted to search his luggage, he lacked sufficient English
language comprehension to realize that he had a right to refuse the
68.

See id. at 468, 472.
69. [d. at 469.
70. See id. at 469, 472.
71. See id. at 472.
72. See, e.g., State v. Loera, Nos. 11586-1-IlI, 11854-1-III, 1994 Wash. App.
LEXIS 224, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. May 19, 1994); State v. Xiong, 504 N.W.2d 428, 431
32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
73. No. 88 CR 320, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 905 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1989).
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search,74 Similai"ly, in United States v. Restrepo,75 the court sup
pressed the evidence of cocaine obtained from a car search because
the defendant's limited English led him to sign the consent form
"without comprehending what it said about the scope of the search
or his right to refuse."76 In United States v. Gaviria,77 the federal
district court of Rhode Island held that the prosecution had failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
consent to search his plastic shopping bag at a bus terminal was
voluntary or knowing. Therefore, the court granted the defendant's
motion to suppress the cocaine found. The court, relying upon a
court-certified interpreter's testimony that "any native Spanish
speaker would have found it difficult or impossible to understand
much of the detective's Spanish,"78 concluded that the linguistic
competence of the police detective who questioned the Spanish
speaking defendant, partly in English and partly in Spanish, was in
adequate,79 Other factors supported the finding that the consent
was not voluntary, including the defendant's age (twenty-one), his.
limited formal education (only in Columbia), the presence of three
detectives during this encounter, the retention of his green card
throughout the questioning, and the fact that the defendant had
neither read nor signed a written consent form in Spanish. 80 On the
other hand, in State v. Montano,81 the court found that the Cuban
defendant understood English well enough to know that he was
consenting to a search of his residence, and held that failure to com
ply with the state's interpreter statute at the time of the custodial
interrogation was not per se grounds for the suppression of
evidence. 82
The defendant's cultural background is also relevant to the in
74. See id. at *4,6-7.
75. 890 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
76. Id. at 197; see also United States v. Castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that where the issue of voluntary consent to search is raised, a trial court
must carefully review and make specific factual findings as to a defendant's language
comprehension); United States v. Higareda-Santa Cruz, 826 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (D.
Or. 1993) (indicating that consent was not valid where defendant did not have sufficient
knowledge of English to realize he could refuse to consent).
77. 775 F. Supp. 495 (D.R.I. 1991).
78. Id. at 500 n.6.
79. See id. at 496, 500.
80. See id. at 500, 502. The court noted that Hispanic suspects are "doubly disad
vantaged" by having English language difficulty while also lacking familiarity with
Fourth Amendment rights to the Constitution. See id. at 502.
81. 855 P.2d 979 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
82. See id. at 983-84.
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quiry of whether consent was given and may lead to the granting of
a motion to suppress. For example, in United States v. Gallego
Zapata,83 the federal district court of Massachusetts rejected the
prosecution's claim of consensual search of the Columbian defend
ant's bag and jacket at a stop upon his arrival at Logan Airport,
from a flight from New York, and granted the defendant's motion
to suppress the cocaine seized. The court relied upon the defend
ant's extremely limited fluency in English, in combination with the
defendant's young age (twenty-two), his limited education (seven
years in Columbia), and his employment in Columbia (as a truck
driver).84 The court also found that as a result of the defendant's
recent arrival in the United States (four months), he "probably
lacked familiarity with his rights under the United States Constitu
tion, including his right to insist that the officers obtain a search
warrant," nor was he told "that he could refuse to allow them to
search."85 Although the police are not required to inform a defend
ant of his right to refuse a search, the failure "can be part of the
totality of the circumstances that indicate that consent was not truly
voluntary."86 The court concluded that the law enforcement agents
lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the defendant's
seizure or the resulting limited search, and lacked probable cause to
justify the more intrusive search. 87
A defendant's subjective fear of a police beating based on his
or her cultural background or national origin may also be a relevant
factor in determining if the consent was coerced, so long as such
fear is reasonable and is based on some objective conduct by gov
ernment officials. 88 However, in State v. VU,89 the defendant, who
was from Vietnam, unsuccessfully argued that a comprehensive ex
planation of the warrant process and the protections it was meant
to afford was required before consent could be voluntary,9o The
court held that while differing cultural values might, in the abstract,
render consent to search involuntary, the defendant himself failed
to argue at trial that his cultural background caused him to be co
83. 630 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1986).
84. See id. at 675.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 668.
87. See id. at 672-75.
88. See United States v. Castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283 n.l, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,558-59 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bus
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973».
89. 770 P.2d 577 (Or. 1989).
90. See id. at 579-80.
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erced into compliance.91
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in State v. Xiong,92 also
found both cultural and language barriers relevant in ruling upon a
motion to suppress. The court declared that "consent did not have
to be fully informed; it merely had to be given in an atmosphere
free of coercive influences. "93 According to the court, the defend
ant's wife, who provided consent to search their home, lacked
knowledge of the American judicial system, lacked understanding
of American customs, had language difficulties, and did not under
stand the word "warrant."94 However, the court affirmed the de
nial of the motion to suppress, holding the consent voluntary, while
nonetheless recognizing that "language barriers make a determina
tion of voluntariness more difficult."95 The court stated that "[t]he
more vulnerable a person is because of his or her unique character
istics, the more easily he or she may be coerced by subtle means."96
According to the court, "[i]f effective communication is not pro
vided, then that is a form of coercion. "97 Despite this careful analy
sis of the role that language difficulties and cultural background
may play in creating coercion, the court found coercion absent, and
based on the totality of the circumstances, found the consent to
search valid. 98
D.

Lineup and Identification

Can a defendant effectively argue that a lineup is unduly sug
gestive because a non-English speaking participant is unable to fol
low the police officer's directions in English? . In People v.
Marquez,99 the court held that a lineup was not unnecessarily sug
gestive, even though the defendant, who spoke Spanish, did not
move as directed when police instructions were stated in English.
Other lineup participants moved only when the instructions were
stated in Spanish, while still others moved when commands were
made in English.10o All six lineup participants were Hispanic males
91.
92.

See id. at 580.
504 N.W.2d 428 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
93. Jd. at 432.
94. Jd. at 430-31.
95. Jd. at 432.
96. Jd. at 431.
97. Jd. at 432.
98. See id.
99. 822 P.2d 418 (Cal. 1992).
100. See id. at 427.
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of similar build.101 The court reached this conclusion even though
the victim believed that the perpetrator did not speak English. The
court did not indicate, however, how it would have ruled if the de
fendant had been the only lineup participant who responded to
Spanish commands.
E.

The Grand Jury

In what circumstances can a defendant successfully object to
the composition of the grand jury as a denial of the defendant's
right to due process? This question was raised in Commonwealth v.
Slaney,102 where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated that "the defendant has the burden of proving that the ab
sence of a certain class from a jury list resulted from an 'arbitrary
and systematic' policy of exclusion directed against an 'identifiable
group in the community which may be the subject of prejudice."'103
In People v. Guzman,104 the defendant, of Hispanic origin,
claimed that Hispanics were deliberately excluded from the jury
pool despite their forming a recognizable, distinct class. Affirming
the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, the
court held that underrepresentation by Hispanics on the grand jury
was not due to purposeful discrimination, but rather to Hispanics'
lower response to summonses, their lower qualifying rate due to
English literacy deficiencies, and other factors. Only purposeful
discrimination would lead to a valid constitutional challenge. 105 .
F.

Preliminary Hearings and Pretrial Proceedings

During any pretrial proceeding, it is critical for the defense and
prosecution to ensure that an interpreter is present on behalf of the
defendant. This does not mean merely that there must be someone
in the courtroom who speaks the defendant's language. The inter
preter should be available exclusively to the defendant to provide
continuous sentence-by-sentence interpretation of the proceedings,
including the court's rulings and open-court colloquy between the
bench and counsel.1 06 In Massachusetts, without evidence of preju
101. See id.
102. 215 N.E.2d 177 (Mass. 1966).
103. [d. at 179 (citations omitted) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,205
(1965); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961)).
104. 454 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), affd, 457 N.E.2d 1143 (N.Y. 1983).
105. See id. at 863.
106. See, e.g., People v. Menchaca, 194 Cal. Rptr. 691, 693-94 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
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dice, use of an informal interpreter such as a fellow prisoner (or
relatives and friends) at the pretrial stage has been held not to vio
late a defendant's rights. However, the Supreme Judicial Court has
stated that the use of an impartial interpreter is preferred, even for
pretrial conferences. t07
Defense counsel and prosecutors may also have an obligation
to attempt to ensure that the defendant obtain the translation of
critical legal documents. In United States v. Mosquera,1OB involving
the narcotics prosecution of eighteen Spanish-speaking defendants,
each with separate counsel, the court held that due process and the
Confrontation Clause required that the criminal defendants be
given written translations of the indictment, relevant parts of cited
statutes, and other documents. An oral description by an inter
preter of the contents of the critical documents was held to be insuf
ficient to satisfy these requirements. Otherwise defendants "would
have to rely on their memory of an oral interpretation that occurred
under circumstances where they might feel ill-at-ease and have dif
ficulty concentrating."109
The Seventh Circuit, however, in Canizales-Satizabal v. United
States,110 distinguishing in part and rejecting in part the ruling in
Mosquera, held that a defendant does not have a constitutional
right to have the indictment or other trial documents "translated
into his own language."111 The court also declared that the federal
interpreter statute did not require written translation of documents,
and that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the lack of
translation. The defendant had been read the indictment in Spanish
and discussed it with his attorney.1 t2
G.

Waiver of Jury Trial
If the defendant waives a jury trial, the presence or absence of

an interpreter during the waiver colloquy, as well as the defendant's
cultural background, are factors relevant to the question of whether
107. See Commonwealth v. Garcia Brito, 525 N.E.2d 383, 388 (Mass. 1988) (hold
ing is clouded by issues of defendant's waiver and lack of timely objection); see also
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 469 n.6 (Mass. 1980).
108. 816 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 48 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994).
109. Id. at 175.
110. No. 95-1831, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38214 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1057 (1996).
111. [d. at *3 n.2.
112. See id. at *4; see also People v. Torres, 310 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ill. App. Ct.
1974) (stating that the defendant was not required to be provided written translation of
the indictment where the defendant was fully informed orally of the charges).
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a waiver was knowing and voluntary. In Commonwealth v.
Abreu,113 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the trial court's finding of waiver of the right to a jury trial was
erroneous where the record indicated that the defendant spoke lit
tle English, came from a foreign nation which did not have jury
trials, and where the record showed that the trial judge asked the
defendant one single question, "phrased in conclusory terms."114
The insufficiency of the non-English speaking defendant's
waiver of the right to jury trial was also successfully raised based on
a one word affirmative response to the judge's question, without
any colloquy, in Lopez v. United States,115 The District of Colum
bia Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings on
the issue. The defendant had only five years of education in her
native Honduras, and had been working as a janitor in the United
States for a year. 116 The court took judicial notice that the jury sys
tem did not exist in Honduras. 117 In contrast, in United States v.
Rosa,118 a Spanish-speaking defendant was unsuccessful in chal
lenging her waiver of a jury trial on the ground that she did not
have the assistance of an interpreter. The court found that the de
fendant adequately understood both the English language and the
waiver proceeding. 119
H.

The Plea Bargain

Culture and language can also present barriers to a defendant's
knowing and intelligent participation in a plea bargain. Under
standing of the elements of the charge and the rights waived are
critical factors. For example, in Valencia v. United States, 120 the de
fendant sought a writ of habeas corpus, contending that when he
had entered his guilty plea, he had not understood the essential ele
ments of the drug offense charged. The First Circuit agreed, finding
that the defendant, who was arrested on a vessel in international
waters but subject to United States jurisdiction, did not receive
clear guidance from the court or counsel on the complex legal ques
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

463 N.E.2d 1184 (Mass. 1984).
[d. at 1186-87.
615 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1992).
See id. at 1147.
See id.
946 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1991).
See ill. at 508.
923 F.2d 917 (1st Cir. 1991).
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tions involved. 121 The defendant had little education or familiarity
with the American legal system but had been assisted by an inter
preter.1 22 The First Circuit also provided instructions to the district
court. It stated that a trial court should personally address the de
fendant in open court, inform the defendant of, and determine that
a defendant understands, every essential element of each alleged
offense to which the plea is offered with due regard for their com
plexity and the individual characteristics of the particular defend
ant,123 In State v. Orozco,124 the Spanish-speaking defendant from
EI Salvador had his plea of guilty vacated after the appellate court
found that the defendant lacked an intelligent understanding of the
elements of the charge (attempted possession of cocaine) com
pounded by his lack of understanding of English. 125 Similarly, in
Diaz v. State,126 the signing of untranslated waivers and trial docu
ments by a defendant caused the defendant's guilty plea for aggra
vated possession of marijuana to be vacated since it was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 127 The defendant,
an indigent Mexican laborer unable to read, write, or understand
English, signed the waivers without an understanding of their
meaning and of the constitutional guarantees implicated. l28
Language barriers combined with cultural background differ
ences led the district court of Illinois, in United States v. Leung,129
to permit the defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas to illegal
gambling. The court held that the defendants' linguistic difficulties
and lack of cultural understanding rendered their guilty pleas invol
untary and unknowing.130 There had been some difficulty with the
interpreter, and the defense stated that counsel's conversations with
the eighty-four year old defendant were "handicapped" by the de
fendant's "unwillingness to express disagreement, a Chinese cul
tural trait."131
Where a trial court enters a plea based on the statement of the
interpreter to the court that the defendant fully understood the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 921-22.
See id. at 921.
See id.
609 So. 2d 1043 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
See id. at 1046.
905 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
See id. at 309.
See id. at 306, 309.
783 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
See id. at 360-61.
Id. at 359.
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court instructions and the effect of the plea, without an interpreted
colloquy on the record between the court and the defendant, the
plea will be vacated for prejudicial error. 132 In Parra v. Page,133 the
appellate court vacated the entry of a plea of guilty for murder that
had been made without an interpreter present at any stage of the
proceeding, where the record reflected that the defendant, an uned
ucated Mexican migrant worker, had a poor knowledge of the Eng
lish language. l34
A defense counsel must fully inform his or her non-English
speaking client of the plea bargain and the rights waived. Testi
mony by an interpreter that the defense attorney failed to fully in
form the defendant of a plea bargain has led to vacation of a plea
and remand.135 Furthermore, allegations that a court interpreter
deliberately failed to interpret accurately the communications be
tween the defense attorney and the defendant about prison time to
be served under the plea bargain may lead to vacation of a guilty
plea, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 136
It is incumbent on defense counsel to point out to the court the
defendant's need for an interpreter at the plea hearing, and to make
a timely objection if the interpreter is not provided or is not compe
tent. For example, in United States v. Japa,137 the First Circuit
found that a Spanish-speaking defendant's plea was knowing and
voluntary where there had been no suggestion to the trial court that
the defendant did not understand what was being said and there
had been no objection to the competency of the interpreter. 138
Similarly, in United States v. Perez ,139 the defendant, a Mexican citi
zen who had resided in the United States for nineteen years, twice
assured the magistrate that he understood the plea proceedings and
did not require an interpreter.14° The Fifth Circuit held that in the
absence of a judicial finding that the defendant's comprehension of
the proceedings was inhibited by language difficulties, the guilty
132. See State v. Pina, 361 N.E.2d 262, 265-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); see also
Monte v. State, 443 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
133. 430 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967).
134. See id. at 836-37.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Navarrette, No. 93-35193, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
14423 (9th Cir. June 10, 1994).
136. See, e.g., Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1994).
137. 994 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1993).
138. See id. at 904.
139. 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990).
140. See id. at 489-90.
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plea was valid. 141
IV.

TRIAL STAGE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Jury Composition

Is the absence or underrepresentation of members of the de
fendant's racial or ethnic group a constitutional violation? In Com
monwealth v. Rodriguez,142 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that while a defendant is constitutionally enti
tled to a jury selection process free of discrimination against his
group in the community, the absence of any member of defendant's
racial or ethnic group in a petit jury pool is not a per se constitu
tional violation. 143 However, absence of jurors from the defend
ant's racial or cultural group may be held to violate the defendant's
due process rights in some instances. l44
To succeed in challenging the venire, a defendant must show
that there had been systematic or purposeful exclusion by a prose
cutor of jurors on the basis of race. 145 Nor may a defendant use
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.1 46 The
challenge must be timely; before a juror is sworn. 147 Even if the
exclusion is purposeful, however, there is no constitutional right to
have a jury composed of non-citizens or of non-English speaking
members. 148
B.

Voir Dire-Jury Selection Process
If there is to be a jury, defense counsel and prosecutors should

prepare voir dire questions relevant to the defendant's or a wit
ness's language or cultural barriers. Prospective jurors should be
141. See id. at 491; see also Corado v. State, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2960, at *3-4
(Tex. App. Nov. 27, 1991).
142. 300 N.E.2d 192 (Mass. 1973).
143. See id. at 196-97.
144. See, e.g., Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 902-05 (Alaska 1971).
145. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 93-99 (1986); see also Commonwealth v. Colon, 558 N.E.2d 974, 986 (Mass. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499,508-16 (Mass. 1979); id. at 516 ("group affili
ations which may not permissibly form the basis for juror exclusion: sex, race, color,
creed or national origin"); Rodriguez, 300 N.E.2d at 196-97.
146. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-59 (1992); see also Common
wealth v. Harris, 567 N.E.2d 899, 903 (Mass. 1991) (stating that a peremptory challenge
of the only member of a protected class by the prosecution or the defendant is pre
sumptively discriminatory and improper).
147. See Rodriguez, 300 N.E.2d at 196.
148. See Commonwealth v. Acen, 487 N.E.2d 189, 194-96 (Mass. 1986).
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prepared for the fact that the defendant or witness will be using an
interpreter during the trial and they should be asked questions to
determine whether they have any linguistic or cultural biases.
However, information provided to prospective jurors by de
fense counsel about the illegal immigrant status of the defendant
that may create prejudicial misconceptions about the defendant,
even if the reference was part of a supposed defense voir dire strat
egy, may create grounds for reversal for ineffective assistance of
counsel.1 49 In Hernandez v. New York,150 the United States
Supreme Court held that prosecutors did not discriminate by chal
lenging for cause and stril;dng Spanish and English-speaking bilin
gual prospective jurors whose conduct suggested that they might be
unwilling to agree to rely solely on the interpreter's official inter
pretation of a Spanish-speaking witness's testimony.151 The prose
cution based its juror challenges on the "specific responses and the
demeanor" of the two prospective jurors during voir dire, and not
their language proficiency alone. 152
Does counsel need to ensure that an interpreter is available for
a non-English-speaking defendant during the voir dire? One fed
eral appeals court has held that a trial judge's failure to ensure that
the voir dire was interpreted did not violate a Spanish-speaking de
fendant's right to be present and participate in jury selection. 153
The defendant had lived and worked in the United States for over
seven years and had an interpreter present and readily available to
him so that he could consult with his counsel throughout the voir
dire. 154 However, in Martinez v. State,155 the Indiana Court of Ap
peals held that since jury selection is a critical stage of a criminal
proceeding, the absence of an interpreter during jury selection jeop
ardized the defendant's right to "assistance of counsel and his right
to be meaningfully present at every stage of the proceedings."156
149. See, e.g., Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 726-27, 734-36 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (en banc) (holding that the defense was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of
counsel).
150. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
151. See id. at 369-70.
152. [d. at 360; see also Commonwealth v. Festa, 341 N.E.2d 276, 282-83 (Mass.
1976) (without regard of prejudice, court assumed that two Italian-speaking jurors
properly followed the judge's instructions to disregard witness testimony made in ital
ian not interpreted into English).
153. See United States v. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d 1284, 1291-92 (8th Cir.
1985).
154. See id.
155. 449 N.E.2d 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
156. [d. at 310.
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Trial and Trial Examinations

As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
stated, "[t]he right to an interpreter rests most fundamentally ... on
the notion that no defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of
an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment."157
Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court declared, in State v. Na
tividad,158 that holding a trial for a defendant who is unable to un
derstand the English language without an interpreter "would be as
though a defendant were forced to observe the proceedings from a
soundproof booth ... , being able to observe but not comprehend
the criminal processes whereby the state had put his freedom in
jeopardy. Such a trial comes close to being an invective against an
insensible object."159
In the most sweeping decision upholding a non-English-speak
ing defendant's constitutional right to an interpreter under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the United States Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit, in United States ex rei. Negron v. New
York,160 held that the summary interpretation of testimony at a
murder trial for an illiterate, indigent Puerto Rican defendant ren
dered the trial constitutionally infirm.161 Similarly, the Appeals
Court of Massachusetts has also stated in dicta, in Commonwealth
v. Tureli,162 that "the assistance of an interpreter may well be a mat
ter of right 'where the indigent defendant has little or no under
standing of English. "'163 It has also been held that when defense
counsel also serves as an interpreter during any stage of the crimi
nal proceeding, a defendant is denied his constitutional rights, and
157. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973); see also United
States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207,1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a defendant should
not be inhibited from comprehending the proceedings or testimony given against him in
English); People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201-05 (Cal. 1984) (outlining the
parameters of the constitutional right to an interpreter throughout criminal proceed
ings); People v. Escalante, 627 N.E.2d 1222, 1227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (constitutional
right of confrontation requires the presence of an interpreter during cross-examination
of police officers); State v. Kounelis, 609 A.2d 1310, 1313-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) (stating that a defendant who is unable to speak or understand English has a
constitutional right to have the trial proceedings translated to permit the defendant to
participate in the defense).
158. 526 P.2d 730 (Ariz. 1974).
159. [d. at 733.
160. 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
161. See id. at 388-90.
162. 381 N.E.2d 1123 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (rescript).
163. [d. at 1124 (quoting Negron, 310 F. Supp. at 1307); see also Parra v. Page,
430 P.2d 834, 837 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967); Villarreal v. State, 853 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993).
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his conviction requires reversal.1 64
Citing the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be present at
a trial and to confront witnesses against him, the Illinois Court of
Appeals, in People v. Escalante,165 reversed and remanded a convic
tion for burglary of a motor vehicle after a bench trial because of
the court's failure to wait for the interpreter or to grant a continu
ance. Such judicial conduct was held to constitute an abuse of dis
cretion, rendering the non-English-speaking defendant, in essence,
not present at tria1. 166
It is generally the duty and burden of the defendant to raise the
need for an interpreter in a timely fashion. 167 However, once the
defendant requests an interpreter through counsel, the trial court
must conduct an inquiry into the defendant's ability to speak and
understand English. 168 Even if the defendant fails to raise the need
for an interpreter, a court has a duty to inquire "as to the need for
an interpreter when a defendant has apparent difficulty with
English. "169
Since the trial court is in a superior position to evaluate a de
fendant's fluency in the English language, wide discretion is granted
by an appellate court in making this assessment. In Massachusetts,
it has been held that the trial judge has broad discretion to deter
mine the level of a defendant's language barrier, the stage in a pro
ceeding at which an interpreter must be provided, and how much
164. See People v. Chavez, 177 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
165. 627 N.E.2d 1222, 1227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
166. See id. at 1228. However, the remedy for any failure to provide a qualified
interpreter at a default judgment hearing in the state district court in Massachusetts is
to give the defendant a rehearing with an interpreter. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Espi
noza, 546 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
167. See United States v. Torres, No. 94-1113, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 264, at *20
(6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2628 (1995).
:
168. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 15 (lst Cir. 1974); see also
Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 F. Supp. 504, 508 (M.D. Fla. 1989); State v. Neave, 344
N.W.2d 181, 188-89 (Wis. 1984).
169. Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing the
Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1827); see also United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d
1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980); Carrion, 488 F.2d at 15; Hrubec v. United States, 734 F.
Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the trial court must determine the need for
an interpreter only when it is evident that the defendant has language difficulties which
inhibit his comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counselor the
judge); State v. Yang, 549 N.W.2d 769, 771-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that when
ever a trial court has doubt as to the defendant's competency to communicate with
counsel in English, to understand the testimony of witnesses, or to be understood when
speaking, it has sufficient notice of defendant's language difficulties to require a suspen
sion of the trial to hold a hearing and to make a factual determination of the need for
an interpreter).
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translation is required. 170 The denial of a motion for an interpreter
should be made outside the presence of the jury "because of the
negative inference that may be drawn from the court's refusal."171
Defense counsel and the prosecutor should ensure that the
trial court appoints a "defense interpreter" for the defendant, sepa
rate from the "witness interpreter" used by a court to translate the
testimony of non-English-speaking witnesses. 172 In People v. Ro
mero,173 involving a prosecution for second degree murder, the
Spanish-speaking defendant was held to have been denied due pro
cess of law under the federal and state constitutions when one inter
preter was used both to assist the defendant and to interpret the
testimony of eight Spanish-speaking witnesses, even with the accord
of defense counsel,l74 Using only one interpreter may deny a de
fendant "a spontaneous understanding of the testimony and the
proceedings."175 However, where the Spanish-speaking defend
ant's interpreter was borrowed to interpret the testimony of Span
ish-speaking witnesses, no error was found since the defendant did
not need an interpreter to understand the testimony of those
witnesses. 176
The role of the "witness" interpreter at trial is to perform con
tinuous word-for-word interpretation of counsel's questions and the
responses of witnesses at the trial, with no editing by the inter
preter. Nor should the interpreter engage in any private colloquies
with the witness. The interpreter's sole role is to translate, not to
advise the witness or the defendant,177
170. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460,469-70 (Mass. 1980).
171. Commonwealth v. Pana, 364 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1979).
172. See People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Cal. 1984) (detailing three
distinct but interrelated roles of "defense," "witness," and "proceeding" interpreters).
173. 200 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
174. See id. at 406.
175. Id.; see also People v. Nieblas, 207 Cal. Rptr. 695, 696-97 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (borrowing of defense interpreter for testimony of three prosecution witnesses
causes reversal of murder conviction for denial of defendant's constitutional rights); In
re Dung T., 206 Cal. Rptr. 772,776-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (right of defendant to own
interpreter guaranteed by the California Constitution).
176. See Falciola v. State, No. 04-95-00366-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3158, at
*2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. July 24, 1996); see also People v. Avila, 797 P.2d 804, 806 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1990); State v. Kounelis,609 A.2d 1310, 1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(court stated that it may be permissible to have only one interpreter if the witness inter
preter is available to translate testimony of English-speaking witnesses for the defend
ant); State v. Vue, Nos. 95-0782-CR-NM, 95-0783-CR-NM, 1995 Wis. App. LEXIS 1180,
at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1995).
177. These and other practical guidelines on the use of interpreters at trial were
provided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Festa,
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Failure to provide a personal interpreter for each defendant
during the reading of jury instructions may, in certain circum
stances, require reversal if the defendant can demonstrate that he
tried, unsuccessfully, to communicate with counsel at that junc
ture. 178 But the failure to provide an interpreter during closing ar
guments and jury instructions has been held to constitute harmless
error if there is no evidence that the basic fairness of the trial was
compromised. 179 It has also been held to be prejudicial error for a
trial court to have the stenographer read back testimony to the jury
without waiting for the interpreter to be present so that the defend
ant could "effectively participate in the readback of the
testimony."180
For a waiver of the right to an interpreter to be effective, the
defendant must knowingly and voluntarily relinquish that right.18I
The California Supreme Court has held that a waiver must be per
sonally made by the defendant with an "'affirmative showing,' on
the record," through an open court colloquy with the defendant. 182
Failure to request an interpreter does not constitute a waiver, and
any waiver may be withdrawn by the defendant at any stage of the
criminal proceeding. 183
Appellate courts have developed varied standards for review
of the denial of an interpreter by a trial court. In Massachusetts,
the Supreme Judicial Court has stated that the judge's exercise of
his discretion in providing interpreter services at trial will only be
disturbed on appeal if "the record reveals blatant insensitivity to a
language problem" resulting in a fundamentally unfair trial,184
"The test for both confrontation and effective assistance cases in
this context is the same: was the defendant hampered by a language
problem in any meaningful way in presenting his defense?"185
"[T]he crucial factor is the level of fluency of a given defendant."186
Other courts have applied a less stringent standard of review than
341 N.E.2d 276, 283-84 (Mass. 1976); see also United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 442
43 (1st Cir. 1986).
178. See People v. Chavez, 283 Cal. Rptr. 71,75-76 (Cal. Ct. App.1991).
179. See Luu v. People, 841 P.2d 271, 275 (Colo. 1992).
180. People v. Pizzali, 552 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
181. See State v. Natividad, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (Ariz. 1974); In re Dung T., 206 Cal.
Rptr. 772, 778-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Kounelis, 609 A.2d at 1314.
182. People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1204 (Cal. 1984); see also In re Dung
T., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
183. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221C, § 3 (1994).
184. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 470 (Mass. 1980).
185. Id. at 470 n.7.
186. Id. at 470.

220

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:193

the Massachusetts "blatant insensitivity" test. 187
The trial court· also has wide discretion to determine whether a
witness shall be examined with the aid of an interpreter. 188 How
ever, in Commonwealth v. Pana,189 a conviction was reversed be
cause the judge, without justification, had denied the defendant's
request to testify in Spanish. A court-appointed interpreter had
been present at trial and had assisted the defendant, who spoke
some English, with particular words and phrases. 19o While testify
ing, the defendant's language difficulties became so acute that the
assistant district attorney joined in the request.1 91 The appellate
court held that even though the decision to use an interpreter rests
in the sound discretion of the trial judge, the defendant in this case
was effectively denied his right to testify, resulting in prejudicial er
ror.192 The court observed that "a witness may be unable to under
stand or respond to questions, particularly on cross-examination,
due to the tenseness and unfamiliarity of the circumstances, even
though he has some familiarity with English."193
In United States v. Mayans,194 the Ninth Circuit reversed a drug
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial after the trial
court ordered the withdrawal of the defendant's interpreter, and
after urging the defendant to testify in English in the name of effi
ciency. The reversal was based on the grounds that the defendant's
statutory right to an interpreter and his constitutional right to tes
tify on his own behalf had been denied. 195 The Ninth Circuit chas
tised the district court for requiring the defendant to, in effect,
submit to a test of his English while testifying on the stand before
the jury.196
The qualifications of an interpreter fall within the area of the
187. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) (total
ity of the circumstances test for effective assistance of counsel claims); United States v.
Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985) (four-prong due process test); United
States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1980) ("fundamental fairness" test); Vas
quez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932, 938 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("would results of proceedings
have been different" test for effective assistance of counsel claims).
188. See United States v. Tejada, 886 F.2d 483, 488-89 (1st Cir. 1989).
189. 364 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1976).
190. See id. at 896.
191. See id. at 897.
192.. See id. at 898-99.
193. Id. at 899...
194. 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994).
195. See id. at 1180-81.
196. See id. at 1181.
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judge's discretion.1 97 However, a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to be confronted by the witnesses against him
may be violated when a trial court appoints an ineffective and in
competent interpreter. In People v. Starling,198 which involved an
appeal of a robbery conviction, the prosecution complained that it
had difficulty understanding the translated testimony of a witness.
Despite frequent admonitions from the judge, the interpreter en
gaged in unrecorded discussions with the complaining witness. It
was held that the trial court abused its discretion in the selection
and retention of the unqualified interpreter. 199
When either the defense or prosecution questions the qualifi
cations or competency of the interpreter, contests the interpreter's
ability to communicate with the defendant or witness, or challenges
whether the interpreter is unbiased, counsel should request a hear
ing prior to trial to examine such competence or bias, which may
include a voir dire of the interpreter. 2oo If misinterpretations are
claimed during trial, objections should be made outside the hearing
of the jury.201
During the trial, the prosecution or defense may challenge in
accurate or incomplete interpretations to cure them. This can be
accomplished by cross-examination, by introducing independent ev
idence of incorrect interpretation, or by cross-examining the inter
preter himself as to what the witness had said. 202 Objections to trial
interpretation errors must be made in a timely fashion or they are
generally waived. 203 In one case, United States v. Urena,204 a de
fendant's general objections to the competency of an interpreter
were held sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.205 However,
197. See Commonwealth v. Salim, 503 N.E.2d 1267, 1274 (Mass. 1987).
198. 315 N.E.2d 163 (III. App. Ct. 1974).
199. See id. at 168.
200. See State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848,857-58 (Kan. 1984); see also People v.
Estrada, 221 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
201. See Van Pham, 675 P.2d at 858.
202. See State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824,831-32 (Minn. 1987); State v. Her, 510
N.W.2d 218,222-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862,875 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1368 (1995); see also People v.
Johnson, 120 Cal. Rptr. 372,373-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that it is prejudicial
error for the trial court to refuse the defendant a-meaningful opportunity to impeach
the translation of the interpreter).
203. See Ramirez v. Price, 1994 U.S. App. LEX IS 35701, at *10 (10th Cir. Dec.
19,1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1435 (1995); Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564,
1566 (11th Cir. 1989); State V. Vue, Nos. 95-0782-CR-NM, 95-0783-CR-NM, 1995 Wis.
App. LEXIS 1180, at *3-4 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1995).
204. 27 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1994).
205. See id. at 1492.
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the Spanish-speaking defendant's conviction for drug-related
charges was affirmed due to insufficient evidence of interpreter in
competence. 206 The court noted that if the defendant's objections
were focused on misinterpretation of a "particular, key portion of
testimony," rather than on a broad claim of interpreter incompe
tence, the result may have been different. 207 In another case, the
Utah Court of Appeals denied a defendant's appeal of the appoint
ment of a Cantonese interpreter on the ground that the interpreter
had no experience in court interpretation, and was incompetent as
well as biased. 208 The court held that the defendant failed to partic
ularize his objections or show actual prejudice. 209
In People v. Cunningham,210 the defendant's conviction for
first degree criminal sexual conduct was reversed on the ground
that the interpreter for the complainant interfered with the defend
ant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. In
stead of providing "'to the witness the precise form and tenor of
each question propounded, and no more or less,'" and instead of
interpreting '''the precise expressions of the witness,'" the inter
preter "had a conversation with the complainant" for the purposes
of clarification that was not translated for the jury.211 Whereas vio
lation of the right to adequate cross-examination is generally sub
ject to harmless-error analysis, the Michigan Court of Appeals
found it impossible to apply this standard in the absence of a tape
recording of the cross-examination at issue.212
In People v. Torres ,213 the court ruled that it was improper to
admit a translated transcript of a tape recorded conversation of an
alleged drug transaction because the defendant was not afforded an
opportunity to challenge the qualifications of the original inter
preter and "the accuracy of the transcript" through cross-examina
tion of that interpreter. 214 However, the court held that this was
not reversible error since the defendant could have either called his
own expert interpreter or challenged the accuracy of the transcript
by questioning the bilingual investigating police officer who was
206. See id: at 1492-93.
207. Id. at 1491 n.3.
208. See State v. Fung, 907 P.2d 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
209. See id. at 1194.
210. 546 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
211. Id. at 716 (quoting Rajnowski v. Detroit, B.C. & A.R. Co., 41 N.W. 849, 850
(Mich. 1889)).
212. See id. at 717.
213. 210 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
214. Id. at 376-77.
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present during the questioning. 215
D.

Trial Defenses Based on Culture

As discussed above, defense counsel have at times successfully
raised the issue of cultural differences to lead various courts to sup
press defendants' statements made to law enforcement officials.
However, defendants have found it difficult to assert successfully
that cultural differences justify or excuse criminal conduct. In one
case, a rape defendant, an Iranian who had lived in the United
States only two years, contended that his limited and infrequent use
of English and his lack of familiarity with American social mores
prevented him from perceiving that the mentally retarded victim
lacked mental capacity to consent.216 The appeals court was not
persuaded, noting that the defendant had testified at trial without
an interpreter and that his testimony indicated an intelligent under
standing of the proceeding.217 In another case, ~ Hmong was con
victed of raping a recent Hmong immigrant to whom he was
providing job counseling.218 The defendant asserted unsuccessfully
that rape was not a concept recognized within Hmong culture. 219
A cultural defense was also rejected in Ha v. State ,220 where
the trial court had refused to grant a self-defense instruction for a
Vietnamese defendant on a second-degree murder charge. The de
fendant argued that he reasonably believed that he was facing fu
ture harm from the victim and, because of his Vietnamese cultural
background, believed that he could not receive help from the po
lice.221 The appellate court agreed that understanding Vietnamese
culture was relevant in evaluating the victim's motivation or readi
ness to kill the defendant, and was a proper matter to be consid
ered. 222 But the court found that the defendant failed to produce
215. See id. at 377; see also United States v. Fuentes-Montijo, 68 F.3d 352, 354-56
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a defendant did not dispute the accuracy of the
translated transcript of a tape recording, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
using the transcript at tria\); United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1457-58 (1st Cir.
1992) (arguing that a defendant's right to confrontation in connection with cross-exami
nation of a translator is not violated by merely deferring the cross-examination for good
cause); United States v. Perez, No. 94-0192, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43, at *2, 11-13
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 1996).
216. See People v. Farrokhi, 414 N.E.2d 921, 923-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
217. See id. at 925.
218. See State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
219. See id. at 221-22.
220. 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
221. See id. at 195.
222. See id.
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evidence that he reasonably believed that he was subject to an im
minent threat of harm, as was legally required for a valid self-de
fense claim.223

E.

The Prosecutor's Use of the Defendant's Culture to Prove
Guilt

Defendants have also challenged the prosecution's use of cul
tural background or stereotypes to prove guilt. In Varughese v.
State,224 an Indian defendant, convicted of murdering his wife by
setting her on fire, attempted unsuccessfully to rebut the State's ar
gument that, in India, wife burning is a common way to dispose of
an unwanted spouse. 225 The defendant argued instead that his wife
had followed Indian customs by immolating herself. 226 The defend
ant also argued that his nationality and alien status were used to
create hostility against him.227 The court ruled, however, that the
defendant waived any objection by failing to timely object. 228
Cultural background has been successfully used by prosecutors
to counteract a defendant's evidence or by explaining a victim's re
sponse or conduct at the time of the crime. When one defendant
evoked the mores of a foreign land in order to excuse or justify his
unlawful conduct, the prosecution then countered with contrary ev
idence from the same culture. In State v. Her,229 the prosecutor
presented evidence that a Hmong woman would not seduce a
Hmong man, but only in response to the defendant's testimony that
"'there is no such thing as rape'" in Hmong culture.23° In State v.
Lee,231 the defendant unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the
prosecution had engaged in misconduct by presenting rebuttal ex
pert and lay witness evidence that the victim's failure to flee and
her delay in reporting the offense were due to Hmong cultural re
straints. 232 The testimony served to counteract the defendant's tes
timony. concerning Hmong attitudes about rape. 233
Cultur~l issues may be inappropriately raised by prosecutors at
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See id.
892 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
See id. at 193.
See id.
See id. at 192.
See id. at 194.
510 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 221.
494 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1992).
See id. at 480.
See id.
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trial. For example, a prosecutor's statements at examination and at
closing about a Moroccan defendant's cultural background, con
cerning the negative attitudes of residents of Morocco towards wo
men, were held to be improper. 234 The court, however, concluded
that those statements did not prejudicially affect the rights of the
defendant. 235
V.

A.

PosT-TRIAL STAGE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Sentencing

Although the defendant has a right to have his or her hired
interpreter at the sentencing hearing, a court is not required to ap
point one, even if an interpreter was present during the trial, as long
as the defendant has sufficient command of English.236 However,
one state appellate court has held that the failure to provide simul
taneous interpretation by an interpreter for the entire sentencing
proceeding, "a critical stage of the criminal trial, constituted a denial
of due process.237 The appellate court vacated the plea agreement
for second degree murder. 238
Similarly, in Monte v. State,239 the Spanish-speaking defendant
successfully appealed a seven year prison term for second degree
murder, based on the trial court's failure to appoint an interpreter
for his sentencing hearing. The court found reversible error, va
cated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing, even though
defense counsel failed to object to the lack of an interpreter. 24o The
court held that the denial was a fundamental violation of the de
fendant's right to be present at sentencing. 241 The court stated that
"[o]ur system of justice has evolved too far for a defendant's ac
knowledged language problem to cause him to be placed in a posi
tion before the court which is not equal to that of an English
speaking defendant in terms of communicative opportunities."242
Although the trial court had not appointed an interpreter for sen
234. See State v. Boulabeiz, 634 N.E.2d 700, 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
235. See id.
236. See Commonwealth v. Rosadilla-Gonzalez, 480 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1985).
237. See State v. Hansen, 705 P.2d 466, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Note that in
this case there was evidence that interpretation was so inadequate during other stages
of the trial that it violated due process. See id.
238. See id.
239. 443 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
240. See id. at 342.
241. See id.
242. Id.
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tencing, it did so for the plea hearing. 243 However, because of ques
tions as to the qualifications of the interpreter at the plea hearing,
as well as apparent problems with the interpretation provided, the
appellate court also stated that the defendant would not be pre
cluded from seeking post-conviction relief to challenge the validity
of his plea.244
B.

Cultural Issues in Sentencing

Defense counsel should ensure that the court, in sentencing,
consider how the defendant's cultural heritage or background may
suggest circumstances in favor of mitigation. Moreover, defense
counsel should alert the court to cultural background differences
that might explain surprising, unusual, or incomprehensible behav
ior or demeanor on the part of the defendant. For example, in Peo
ple v. Superior Court (Soon fa Du ),245 the appellate court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting probation in a
voluntary manslaughter case where the trial court had found that
the defendant's" 'failure to verbalize her remorse to the Probation
Department [was] much more likely a result of cultural and lan
guage barriers rather than an indication of a lack of true re
morse. "'246 Along similar lines, a federal district court granted
habeas corpus after it found that the defendant's counsel had failed
to present evidence from an anthropologist and sociologist that the
defendant's "apparent lack of emotion at trial did not necessarily
indicate disinterest or coldness, but was consistent with cultural ex
pectations of Chinese males. "247
On the other hand, two United States courts of appeals have
held that cultural differences were not grounds to depart downward
from the sentencing guidelines. In United States v. Yu,248 a Korean
tax lawyer sentenced to prison for attempting to bribe an IRS agent
unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred in failing to con
sider his cultural background which had led him to think it would
be insulting not to offer a bribe. 249 The Eighth Circuit also affirmed
243. See id. at 340.
244. See id. at 341 n.3.
245. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
246. Id. at 181.
247. Kwan Fai Mak v. Blodgett, 754 F. Supp. 1490,1499 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd
per curiam and remanded, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992).
248. 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992).
249. See id. at 953, 954-55.
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the sentence in United States v. Natal-Rivera,25o where the defend
ant was sentenced for conspiring with her male companion to dis
tribute cocaine. She argued for reversal on the ground that the
district court should have considered as a mitigating factor that Pu
erto Rican women were socialized from childhood to follow their
future husband's every command. 251 The court held that the trial
court did not err in failing to take this into account. 252 Similarly, a
Vietnamese defendant failed to persuade an appellate court in
Texas that he was unfairly sentenced to death by a jury who had
"'no understanding of the cultural concepts and mores of the Ori
ental people, and with little or no understanding as to their thought
processes, which must be different than ours."'253
In Flores v. State,254 the defendant was convicted of driving
while intoxicated and sentenced to one year in prison. 255 The trial
court, having found that the county in Texas where the trial took
place had no rehabilitation program for Spanish-speaking persons
convicted of alcohol related offenses, and that the state program
offered in Spanish was worthless, denied probation. 256 Flores peti
tioned for discretionary appellate review, arguing that the trial
court's consideration of linguistic competence as a factor in assess
ing punishment was a denial of due process and equal protection of
the laws under the United States and Texas Constitutions. 257 The
Texas court applied only a rational basis test to this denial, since
probation is not a fundamental right and since language ability, un
like race or national origin, is not a suspect classification. 258 The
court concluded that incarceration of this defendant was an appro
priate punishment in the absence of any meaningful altemative. 259
The court declined to examine the disproportionate effect that such
a denial would have on Hispanics convicted of driving while intoxi
cated. 260 Following United States Supreme Court precedent, the
Texas court refused to substitute disparate impact analysis for that
250. 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989).
251. See id. at 393.
252. See id.
253. Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929,940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en bane) (quot
ing Appellant's Brief at 29-30).
254. 904 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en bane), cer!. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716
(1996).
255. See id.
256. See id. at 130.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 130-31.
259. See id. at 131.
260. See id.
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of discriminatory intent, or to extend disparate impact analysis into
the realm of criminallaw. 261
CONCLUSION

Our criminal justice system serves large numbers of individuals
whose primary language is not English or who come from vastly
different cultures. Courts are faced with the difficult challenge of
effectively administering to the legal needs of those participants
with language or cultural barriers. This challenge can only be suc
cessfully met with the active participation and commitment of pros
ecutors, defense counsel, and the courts.
Courts have a constitutional mandate to ensure that our legal
system provides equal access to justice, regardless of race, national
origin, language, or culture. Defense counsel and prosecutors have
the legal and ethical responsibility to raise issues of effective com
munication and to reduce prejudice against defendants, complain
ants, and witnesses who do not speak or understand English, or
who are from a different country and culture.
.
Relatively few of the complex legal and factual issues that arise
due to language or cultural differences have been thoroughly ex
amined by the courts, resulting in a lack of clear guidance as to the
exact contours of the rights implicated. Case law in criminal pro
ceedings will further develop only if prosecutors and defense coun
sel more often raise, and courts more often address, these issues at
all stages of criminal proceedings. Only then will the clear stan
dards necessary to ensure constitutional and statutory guarantees
be established for all participants in the criminal justice system.

261. See id.

